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Abstract 
 
The Internet and social media have become a pervasive part of our global 
environment over the last few decades, utilized primarily for commerce, communication, 
and entertainment. The last several years, however, have seen an increase in the 
application of social media in political discourse and activities, primarily in developed 
democracies and autocracies. Does that mean social media can influence democratic 
transition and consolidation in the 21st century? Are the examples of the Green 
Movement in 2009 and the Arab Spring in 2011 a validation of social media in service to 
democracy, or is social media also a tool for surveillance and disruption by autocratic 
states?  This paper examines, through case selections of four countries, the use of social 
media during protests in Iran and Egypt, and the use of social media as possible 
instruments of democratic consolidation in Nepal and South Africa.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This has been a particularly long journey for me, both in distance and time. I 
received my Bachelor of Arts degree with a major in political science from the University 
of California, Los Angeles on September 10, 1971. Decades later, I decided to revisit and 
formalize my interest in political science and enroll in an academic institution in the city I 
have lived in for more than 30 years. I wanted the challenge of expanding my knowledge 
and mind in a structured environment.   
I want to acknowledge the help and guidance I received from Chris Hudgins, 
Dean of the College of Liberal Arts, and John Tuman, Chair of the Political Science 
Department, when I first decided to take a nondegree seeking class from the department.  
Dr. Dennis Pirages was one of the professors who taught my first class and I am indebted 
to him for his suggestions and encouragement. After taking another class with Dr. 
Pirages, I decided to formally apply for the master’s program and was accepted.   
Dr. Pirages graciously agreed to chair my master’s advisory committee. I want to 
thank the other committee members, which include Dr. David Damore, who has always 
challenged my thinking about statistics, and Dr. Michelle Kuenzi, who has helped to 
expand my knowledge about democracy. Dr. Gary Larson kindly agreed to serve as a 
committee member from outside the department and I appreciate his expertise. 
I want to thank the staff at the political science department, Susie Lafrentz and 
Melissa Rodriguez, who helped keep me on track through the years. 
v 
 
I also want to thank Susie Skarl and Stephen D. Fitt, Ph.D. of the UNLV Lied 
Library, who assisted me with research suggestions and direction, as well as all of the 
research librarians who helped me throughout the last year. 
My classmates over the years were a great source of encouragement and 
feedback. A special note of thanks to Jonathan “Doc” Bradley for his welcoming ways 
when I took my first class and his counsel throughout the years. 
Most importantly, I would not have been motivated to take any classes, let alone 
apply for graduate school, without the encouragement of my wife, Gina, who probably 
sees more in me than I do myself. 
  
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract iii 
Acknowledgements iv 
List of Tables                                                                                                         vii 
Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 2: Methodology 5 
Chapter 3: Modernization, Democratization and Social Media 10 
Chapter 4: Democratic Transition and Consolidation 18 
Chapter 5: Social Media 32 
Chapter 6: Case Selection: Iran                                                                              35 
Chapter 7: Case Selection: Egypt 41 
Chapter 8: Case Selection: Nepal 45 
Chapter 9: Case Selection: South Africa 55 
Chapter 10: Conclusion                                                                                          64 
References                                                                                                              68 
Author’s Curriculum Vitae                                                                                    74 
  
  
vii 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1 - Iran Internet Users Per 100 People, 2003-2013 38 
Table 2 - Iran Fixed Broadband Internet Subscribers Per 100 People, 2003-2013 39 
Table 3 - Iran Mobile Cellular Subscriptions Per 100 People, 2003-2013 39 
Table 4 - Iran Freedom House Scores, 2004-2014 40 
Table 5 - Egypt Internet Users Per 100 People, 2003-2013 43 
Table 6 - Egypt Fixed Broadband Internet Subscribers Per 100 People,  
                2003-2013 43 
 
Table 7 - Egypt Mobile Cellular Subscriptions Per 100 People, 2003-2013 44 
Table 8 - Egypt Freedom House Scores, 2004-2014 44 
Table 9 - Nepal Internet Users Per 100 People, 2003-2013 52 
Table 10 - Nepal Fixed Broadband Internet Subscribers Per 100 People,  
                  2003-2013 53 
 
Table 11 - Nepal Mobile Cellular Subscriptions Per 100 People, 2003-2013 53 
Table 12 - Nepal Freedom House Scores, 2004-2014 54 
Table 13 - South Africa Internet Users Per 100 People,  
                  2003-2013 61  
 
Table 14 - South Africa Fixed Broadband Internet Subscribers Per 100 People,  
                  2003-2013 62 
 
Table 15 - South Africa Mobile Cellular Subscriptions Per 100 People,  
                  2003-2013 62 
 
Table 16 - South Africa Freedom House Scores, 2004-2014 63 
                            
 
  1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
There is general acceptance that the Internet and social media play an integral part 
in today’s global communications and commerce, but what about the influence on the 
political process in countries experiencing democratic transition or consolidation? This 
thesis looks at the use of social media in political protests and mobilization in autocratic 
countries and its potential for use in governance and consolidation in emerging 
democracies. 
There is established utilization, particularly in developed countries, both 
democratic and autocratic, of this new media in “pop” culture and entertainment. Mass 
media organizations have recognized the importance of social media, incorporating it in 
their presentations and structure. In many cases, they create a false dialogue with viewers, 
listeners and readers (“join the conversation”), while controlling the overall narrative, 
whether it is drama or news. The use of Skype, YouTube and other applications of social 
media in national and local televised news reports for interviews of newsmakers and 
videos of news events globally confirm its complementary technical role.   
The digital divide, normally ascribed to those who have access to the Internet and 
social media and those who do not, could also be used to describe the difference between 
democratic and autocratic nations in their approach to, and control of, access and content. 
Penetration and use of social media depend on several factors including density of 
population and economic development. As noted above, both democracies and 
autocracies utilize the Internet for commerce. For uses other than commerce, restrictions 
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of content and continuity depend on the nature of individual regimes. In the realm of 
politics, social media has been utilized by political parties in established democracies to 
fund raise, energize the base, create lists of voters for targeted e-missives and provide 
another channel of message distribution. (Balz, Washington Post, July 28, 2013) It has 
become accepted as a part of the modern political landscape. If, according to Thomas 
Friedman, the world is flat (Friedman 2006), global commerce and social media appear to 
have contributed both to the flattening of it and the facilitation of communications across 
it. In the last two decades, globalization and the concomitant growth of social media have 
not only seemingly flattened the world, but possibly opened the door to a fourth wave of 
democratization.  
The third wave of democratization followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
offered the potential of a unipolar world, led by the United States, advancing towards 
liberal democratic governance or neoliberalism. The possible fourth wave, a consequence 
of accelerated globalization, was least expected to occur in the Middle East. It played out, 
however, most dramatically in the Green Movement of Iran and in the Arab Spring in the 
Middle East. (Khiabany 61) 
In the beginning of the 21st century, the region became the focal point for 
movement away from autocratic governance. In Iran, protesters took to the streets in 
2009 to challenge the reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In Tunisia, 
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali stepped down on January 14, 2011, ten days after 
protests inspired by the death of Mohamed Bouazizi, a 26-year old Tunisian street 
vendor. Ben Ali had been in power for 23 years. In Egypt, President Hosni Mubarak, 
despite ruling autocratically for 30 years, was ousted through protests that lasted 18 days. 
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On February 11, 2011, his resignation was announced. In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, 
an autocrat was displaced, but not the system itself. In the case of Iran, the re-elected 
Ahmadinejad stayed in power with the backing of the regime. In these three cases, social 
media played a part in the process, but the outcomes were different. There is some 
dispute in the literature, however, about the effectiveness and pervasiveness of social 
media in the Green Movement in Iran and in the Arab Spring.   
What part did social media play in this democratic or anti-authoritarian trend? A 
review of the readings suggests social media informed both the local population and the 
international community as to the scope of the protests and contributed to the 
communication and mobilization of protesters. Did it, however, make a significant 
contribution? There is some dispute as to the effectiveness of social media, once numbers 
of users, social media penetration, and counter-measures by authorities are considered. 
For example, based on 2009 estimates by the International Telecommunications Union, 
the percent of the population using the Internet in Egypt was 24% and in Iran was 11%. 
(Kavanaugh et al. 2011, 2) “In Egypt, only 5% of the population uses Facebook, and in 
Iran, the government blocks the site, although many Iranians are able to use proxies.” 
(Kavanaugh et al. 2011, 2) An additional consideration: The difference between the 
production and consumption of online and social media content. (Aday et al. 2013, 2)  
This thesis looks at the influence of social media on stages of democratization, 
both from the communications and mobilization perspective of authoritarian regimes, and 
from the transition and consolidation perspective of emerging democratic regimes. The 
comparative method will be outlined, followed by an overview of the theoretical 
framework of modernization, democratization, democratic transition and consolidation.  
  4 
Four case selections (Iran, Egypt, Nepal and South Africa) will allow a varied view of the 
introduction of social media into the political process. Social media terms are used from 
the perspective of software (i.e. online services or applications) and hardware (i.e. cell 
phones, smart phones and other devices). This paper will offer a view of social media that 
attests to its transformative nature in varied political environments.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  5 
Chapter 2 
Methodology 
 
There are a number of approaches one could take on the subject of social media 
and its influence on stages of democratization. There is a large body of literature on 
democratization and a growing amount of social media literature as well. The challenge is 
to focus a view on the interaction of these two subjects in a given time and structure.  
This narrow view can possibly illuminate the influence of a technology that transforms at 
dazzling speed on one of the world’s oldest political concepts.     
The comparative method is utilized in this paper, looking at four countries from 
2003 to 2013. The relatively short time span is based on the generally accepted 
widespread introduction of social media in the form of MySpace in 2003. As social 
media expanded through the years, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, for example, 
became more popular than MySpace, enlarging its capacity for interactive 
communication and the potential for mobilization.   
How were the four countries chosen? This paper’s intent is to examine countries 
that could represent predominant aspects of the current state of social media and 
democracy. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Arab Republic of Egypt signify the 
significant contemporary application of social media in a region of protest and possible 
democratic transition. Iran has a relatively short modern history of a theocracy with a 
Supreme Leader and dominant clerics in charge (with some democratic elements, such as 
a parliament), succeeding the reign of the Shah in 1979. Iran, both in the past and in its 
current state, is a regional power that also has influence in energy security. That influence 
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is due to its reserves of natural gas and petroleum. The strategic location and importance 
of Iran, the protests generated by perceived vote fraud, the use of social media for 
communication and mobilization during the protests, and the counter measures of the 
state when faced with demonstrators and technology, demonstrated in its totality, a need 
for inclusion in the thesis.  
Egypt, one of the key Arabic-speaking countries in the region, has a modern 
history filled with nationalism, pan-Arabism and authoritarianism. Hosni Mubarak, who 
became the fourth president of Egypt, assumed power after the assassination of Anwar 
Sadat. He was an authoritarian leader who was unlucky enough to be in power when a 
wave of protests began. While not focused, as in Iran, on a disputed election result, the 
protests were more generally aimed at legal, political and economic issues. In an area of 
the world that was assumed to be bereft of democratic impulses, the protests of Egyptians 
and demands for reform resonated around the world. Part of that resonance was due to the 
use of, and perceived reach of, social media, which is why it was compelling to include 
Egypt in this paper. 
Both Iran and Egypt are examples of protest communication and mobilization 
where social media was employed to further those ends. The case selection of Nepal and 
South Africa is based on the potential utilization of social media for democratic 
consolidation. 
The Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal was included due to its circuitous 
transition to democracy, an embryonic Internet infrastructure and emergent social media 
and a low literacy rate. There was civil strife through the 1990s until 2008, when a peace 
treaty was signed and elections were held, ousting the monarchy and electing a 
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Constituent Assembly. Nepal became a federal republic upon an historical vote in June of 
2008 ousting the monarchy in favor of the constituent assembly. Nepal voted to oust the 
monarchy in June 2008. Nepal was formally renamed the Federal Democratic Republic 
of Nepal when it became a federal republic. Nepal has its challenges maintaining a 
democratic state, given domestic opposition, threats against journalists, government use 
of force, and directives to Internet service providers (ISPs) regarding filtering of some 
content.   
Although literacy rates were not one of the indicators examined, it does offer a 
descriptive difference from the other case studies. While Nepal is not a major power nor 
large state, while it does provide scarce resources to the world, and while it does not have 
an impact on the development of global technology, it does provide another view of how 
citizen and political utilization of social media can contribute to democratic consolidation 
in a country that has a diversity of ethnic and linguistic groups. The study of social media 
and democratic consolidation should not be limited to large, powerful and important 
countries. It is the concept that is important, regardless of external considerations. 
The Republic of South Africa was examined for its democratic transition from an 
apartheid state, its regional influence and its current record of elections under universal 
adult suffrage. Given it unique and notorious history on the continent of Africa, it serves 
as an example of the hard work of democratic transition and the potential of social 
media’s impact on democratic consolidation. It has a mixed economy that is the second 
largest in Africa. With the death of Nelson Mandela in 2013, the ruling African National 
Congress’ (ANC) single-party dominance yielded to a more competitive electoral terrain. 
The expanded political field allows for consideration of social media use by all of the 
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other political parties. Despite the opening of the political arena, there were some 
negative aspects in 2013, including governmental restrictions on political events, 
President Jacob Zuma embroiled in a scandal involving state funds, and challenges in the 
mining sector between the ANC-affiliated National Union of Mineworkers and the 
Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union. Despite the challenges, South 
Africa remains a study in democratic transition and consolidation.  
Iran, Egypt, Nepal and South Africa are examined using four indicators, three 
provided by the World Bank and one by Freedom House. The World Bank indicators 
include Internet users (per 100 people), fixed broadband Internet subscribers (per 100 
people), and mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people). The Freedom House scores 
are a representation of levels of freedom in each country. The indicators are discussed in 
each country’s chapter. 
The data from the World Bank was obtained through the International 
Telecommunication Union, World Telecommunication/ICT Development Report and 
database, and World Bank estimates. The indicators are defined thusly: Internet users are 
defined as people with access to the worldwide network; fixed broadband Internet 
subscribers are the number of broadband subscribers with a digital subscriber line, cable 
modem, or other high-speed technology; and mobile cellular telephone subscriptions are 
subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service using cellular technology, which 
provide access to the public switched telephone network. Post-paid and prepaid 
subscriptions are included.  
Freedom House’s “Freedom in the World” is an annual global report on political 
rights and civil liberties. Its scores are obtained and reported in a more narrative manner 
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than the numbers reflected in the World Bank data. The “Freedom in the World” Report 
(2003-2014) derives its methodology primarily from the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. These 
standards are applied globally, despite differences in economic development or 
geographic location or ethnic configuration. They are also based on real-world 
conditions, not government structure or written laws. One is that, “Countries and 
territories with small populations are not penalized for lacking pluralism in the political 
system or civil society if these limitations are determined to be a function of size and not 
overt restrictions by the government or other powerful actors.” (Freedom House) 
Throughout this paper, the difference between the utilization of social media and 
the consumption of social media content is emphasized. Internal consumption of media 
content in each country should be a factor in any analysis. Exogenous consumption of 
social media content may be a factor as well. Facilitated by the diaspora of each nation, it 
could help shape perceptions and may have an influence on an autocratic regime in 
transition or a democratic government that is on the path to consolidation. On the other 
hand, as noted below in the chapter on Iran, external pressure may have little or no effect.    
While social media has a place in democratic transition and consolidation, and 
those contentions are addressed in the case selections, it is also clear that the march of 
technology occurs despite the political structure or challenges to that structure in any part 
of the world. That is a bigger picture for others to address. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Modernization, Democratization and Social Media 
 
Modernization theory helps frame the approach of this paper by representing a 
longer arc of history than social media, yet supporting the understanding of the impact of 
this 21st century phenomenon. A review of the literature helps lay the groundwork for a 
wider look at the influence of social media in stages of democratization in the 21st 
century. 
There are many studied, observed and measured determinants of democratization 
throughout human history. The focus here is on social media, which is a new dynamic 
influence on the democratic continuum. Through the lens of modernization theory, the 
impact of social media can first be demonstrated in the economic sphere. The Internet 
and social media have played an important part in the economic development of most 
nations, allowing for wealth to increase through transactions for goods and services, 
creation of intellectual property, and transmission of entertainment, education, culture 
and interactive communication.  
While there is a dispute in the literature over whether economic development 
encourages or leads to democratization, or whether it helps to prevent a democracy from 
sliding back to autocracy, this paper looks at the potential of social media for political 
activities, including communication and mobilization. It exams the possibility of social 
media contributions to democratic transition and consolidation.   
The economic utilization and social connectivity of social media has been 
established, but can modernization theory incorporate the added political dimension of 
social media in democratic transition and consolidation?  That is the question this thesis 
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looks at through an examination of two recent protests in Iran and Egypt and two case 
selections of emerging democracies.  
While it appears that social media can increase participation in political protests 
through the “contagion effect,” (Schattschneider 1960, 2) and increase awareness of those 
protests through global communications, it is but one step on the road to democratic 
transition and consolidation. It is, however an important step, as it can reflect democratic 
ideals. Ironically, many democratic ideals are concepts that encourage mobilization. 
“Universal ideas in the culture, ideas concerning equality, consistency, equal protection 
of the laws, justice, liberty, freedom of movement, freedom of speech and association 
tend to socialize conflict. These conflicts tend to make conflict contagious; they invite 
outside intervention in conflict and form the basis of appeals to public authority for the 
redress of private grievances.” (Schattschneider 1960, 7). This is a new intersection of 
democracy, modernization and social media.      
One of the prominent proponents of modernization theory, Seymour Martin 
Lipset (Lipset 1959), looks at two aspects of stable democracies: economic development 
and legitimacy. His focus is on the conditions that support a democratic system, not the 
internal mechanisms that provide the rules of the political game. (72) It is a structural 
approach to democracy, incorporating such elements of modernization as education, 
income levels, industrialization and urbanization.   
He was also aware that definitions of democracy would not apply equally to all 
nations. Lipset examines Europe, for example, in a different context than Latin America. 
From his perspective, workers’ integration into the body politic was settled in Europe and 
North America, but not resolved in Latin America. His contention is that a stable 
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democracy requires “moderate tension” between contending political forces and he was a 
proponent of a two-party democratic system, but recognizes social conditions that create 
the need for multi-party contestation. (99)   
Lipset also believes in the power of multiple sources of cleavage, e.g. class, 
religion and regional interests. Federalism, as a structure, encouraged these cleavages. 
Modernization, from Lipset’s view, requires education and economic development to 
sustain democracy. It cannot, in and of itself, create democracy.    
Authors Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi (Przeworski and Limongi 
1997) look at democracy and modernization from the narrow focus of development, 
excluding factors such as religion. They examine Lipset’s view of development and 
democracy, and conclude that effect of income levels determines the destiny of 
established democracies, that democracies are more likely to expire in poor countries and 
survive in wealthy ones. The authors challenge Lipset’s contention that rapid 
development creates unstable democracies. “What destabilizes regimes are economic 
crises, and democracies, particularly poor democracies, are extremely vulnerable to bad 
economic performance.” (169) They conclude that, unlike Lipset, democracy requires 
action by political actors and is not brought into being by structural changes. 
There are challenges to Przeworski and Limongi, and support for Lipset in the 
context of economic development preceding a democratic system. A study in 2006, using 
new data and techniques and a three-way classification of regimes (including partial 
democracies), confirms Lipset’s hypothesis. (Epstein et al. 2006) The authors conclude 
that the third category, partial democracies, is ripe for future study and for policy 
considerations. As countries reform both politically and economically, their leaders will 
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have to decide whether to pursue both reforms simultaneously or sequentially. If 
sequentially, the decision has to be made to put economic reform first or political reform 
first. 
Jan Teorell looks at modernization and democracy and notes the easy conclusion 
that could be reached about economic prosperity linked with democracy. (Teorell 2010)  
The author also points out that there are clear exceptions to this connection, citing the oil-
rich autocrats in the Middle East. Teorell “…finds statistical support for four economic 
determinants of democratization: the level of socioeconomic modernization, short-term 
economic growth, oil abundance, and freedom from state incursion in the economy.” 54) 
Economic crises have implications for autocratic regimes, and citing Haggard and 
Kaufman (1995), O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Przeworski, the author notes that 
such crises cause splits within the elites. He also concludes that media proliferation can 
hinder the formation of coups. The proliferation of social media may play a part in the 
opposite argument, the promotion of democracy, as discussed in this paper. 
Michael K. Miller, in a study of 167 nations from 1875-2004 (Miller 2012) 
demonstrates a seemingly paradoxical result of adding a third element to the mix of 
economic development and democratic change: violent leader removal. His theory: While 
development reduces the likelihood of violent leader removal, it makes democratization 
more likely in the aftermath. “It is an intriguing paradox that democracy is inherently 
peaceful, but violence is not only compatible with democratization -- it is an essential 
component of democratic development over the last 135 years.” (1017) 
Carles Boix looks at democracy and development through a data panel, from early 
nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth century, and concludes that development 
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has a causal effect on democracy, that “…per capita income is statistically associated 
with the process of democratization…” (Boix 2011,827) and there is variation in the 
relationship between income levels and time periods.   
While modernization is but one determinant of democracy, other approaches 
include the study of social and cultural determinants, international factors, regime types 
(including hybrid regimes), institutional arrangements, party systems, and elections.  
Once a democracy is formed and consolidated there is the consideration and study of its 
effect on decisions of war and peace, social and economic choices. 
This paper contemplates the influence of social media in the context of 
democratic transition, and it does so with the understanding that prior works did not 
anticipate this particular form of technology serving as either an impediment or 
accelerant to the process. Such concepts as elite bargaining, foreign aid, military-to-
civilian alteration, and economic crises are part of the larger transition literature. Could 
social media, given its reach endogenously and exogenously, now be considered as part 
of the larger discussion and theories of democratic transition? 
Democratization in any nation can generally be defined, conceptualized, 
measured and analyzed from a variety of perspectives. These perspectives tend to focus 
on the history of a country, i.e. its authoritarian past, its economic development, its 
transition into some form of democracy, its legitimacy at a basic level (free and fair 
elections, competitive parties, etc.), and its progress towards consolidation. There is also 
the role of exogenous forces and factors in influencing democratization in a particular 
country. 
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Jan Teorell (2010) looks at international factors in the third wave by creating a 
model that measures three levels of democracy at three stages: globally, among countries 
belonging to the same region, and neighboring countries. He views three exogenous 
forces at work: international trade, neighbor diffusion and pressure from regional 
international organizations. His conclusions find that trade volume has a negative impact, 
but neighbor diffusion and membership in democratic regional organizations have a 
positive impact.  
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way examine potential exogenous influence, 
adopted by countries after the end of the Cold War. (2005) The challenge to authoritarian 
regimes by the third wave led several to adopt the mantle of democracy. These 
competitive authoritarian regimes were, in many cases, initially viewed as “in transition” 
to democracy. Western leverage, defined as …“governments’ vulnerability to external 
pressure…” as well as “linkage to the West (the density of a country’s ties to the United 
States, the European Union, and Western-led multilateral institutions)…” (21) became 
the two independent variables utilized to study democratization. The authors posit that 
leverage and linkage offers the best change for democratization, but the narrow focus on 
elections is not just insufficient for monitoring, analyzing and taking possible action to 
“leverage” democratization. It speaks to a black-and-white view that seems to be 
particular to the Western world.   
Paul J. Zak and Yi Feng (2003) argue that transitions to democracy occur either 
during economic growth or contraction, with the “middle class” the impetus for change.  
The speed of such transitions are governed by “…inequality, the planning horizon of the 
autocrat, the autocrat’s perceived legitimacy, and the rate of economic growth. (1) Their 
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theory’s focus on the “middle class” as the deciding factor in transition or in changes in 
support for a government is consistent with much of the literature on transition. 
 Democratic consolidation is a term that has many meanings. For purposes of this 
thesis, the term refers to two “classical” categories as outlined by Andreas Schedler 
(Schedler 1998). One is the concept of “…reaching the goal of democratic continuity, 
maintenance, entrenchment, survival, permanence, endurance, persistence, resilience, 
viability, sustainability, or irreversibility.” (95) The other concept is negative, but crucial 
to democracy, i.e. moving away from fragility of the political system. The negative view 
is aimed at keeping democracy alive, free from attempted coups or other challenges. 
Social media, while a relatively new variable in the political world, is utilized in 
both autocratic and democratic societies. One can look at social media as both an 
extension of traditional media, with its gatekeeper function and its control by elites in 
many countries, and as a separate means of communication, with its own rules. Where 
traditional media is a few-to-many concept, social media enables the many to 
communicate among themselves on a global level. Balkin connected this aspect of social 
media with democracy. “Democratic culture is about individual liberty as well as 
collective self-governance; it concerns each individual's ability to participate in the 
production and distribution of culture.” (Balkin 2004, 2) It is Balkin’s contention that 
informational capital is the battleground for social media, and that democratic culture 
must extend to the designing of infrastructure that maximizes expression. The author 
recognizes that social media can be a two-edge sword, sharp for democracy and equally 
sharp for surveillance and control by the state.   
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While this paper looks at social media’s influence on stages of democracy, Balkin 
posits that democratic values must have an influence on social media. The unique ability 
of social media to lower the costs of transmission and reception and allow copying, 
editing and annotating images and copy are what the author would consider part of the 
democratic discourse. “Speech becomes democratized because technologies of 
distribution and transmission are put in the hands of an increasing number of people and 
increasingly diverse segments of society throughout the planet.” (8) The rise of social 
media can be considered a digital revolution and, like many revolutions, create both 
confusion and opportunity.   
Confusion and opportunity offered themselves as the Green Movement played out 
in 2009 along with the Arab Spring in 2011. Here, social media appears to have had an 
effect in the potential of democratic transition. Both countries, clearly non-democratic, 
were flash points for democratic demands. It was a novel moment, where both elites and 
non-elites had access to social media; there was a balance of communication and a 
counter balance of surveillance and blocking of communication.   
Before considering the ramifications of social media use in the Green Movement 
and the Arab Spring, and an examination of two case selections of emerging 
democracies, a look at democratic transition and consolidation will help to define the 
scope of this thesis.    
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Chapter 4 
Democratic Transition and Consolidation 
 
Beyond the mechanics and technical aspects of social media in terms of 
communication and mobilization, there is a larger question to consider. Given its unique 
ability to interconnect on a global scale, and with a low barrier to utilization, can social 
media play a role in regime transformation, and/or transition to and consolidation of 
democratic governance? Kahn and Kellner address this question in their work. “The 
global Internet, then, is creating the base and the basis for an unparalleled worldwide 
anti-war/pro-peace and social justice movement during a time of terrorism, war, and 
intense political struggle.” (Kahn and Kellner 2004, 88) The case for social media and 
emerging democracies could be considered the classic case of the cart before the horse. 
Technology, as noted, is available on a global scale, both in authoritarian regimes and 
democratic governments. If a nation is undergoing a democratic transition and the 
technical tools are in place (though Internet penetration rates may vary from country to 
country), the challenge is to use those tools to further democratic aims in ways that may 
not even be necessary in established democratic countries. Developed countries may not 
require a “call to arms” for challenging democratic backsliding or promoting a 
“progressive” agenda, given the institutions in place. 
This concept of a two (or more) way street of communication and mobilization 
may hold the possibility of encouraging the potential of democratic transition and 
consolidation, since large groups of citizens can express their opinions and preferences in 
real time. But, there is a difference between Internet and social media penetration, and the 
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use thereof. “…Internet use, but not Internet penetration, is associated with greater citizen 
commitment to democratic governance.” (Nisbet, Stoycheff, and  Pearce 249). In other 
words, if you have the tools and fail to use them, there may be no change towards 
democracy. That is what some call the digital divide or simply the unwillingness of a 
segment of any population to adopt technology in the interest of democratic furtherance. 
It is possible a majority of citizens may not wish to participate in democratic transition or 
governance. And, while protests incorporating social media can be organized and 
dispersed with no apparent leadership, building democracy generally requires leadership 
and/or the structure of political parties. 
Social media can provide an ongoing, interactive and pervasive channel, but 
someone (a leader) or something (a political party) must spearhead the transition and 
governance. Just as in the case of the Egyptian experience in chapter six, there must be 
“feet on the ground” to effect and maintain concrete results.  
Could there be a governing model of social media that could produce a 
democratic result and a theoretical framework for social media tools to assist democratic 
transition and governance? The challenge would be to balance such a model of “social 
media governance” against a developing democratic government that also has access to 
countermeasures of blocking, neutralizing and/or surveilling social media. It would not 
be surprising to citizens living under some form of democracy to discover the reality that 
democratic governments also have the ability and can demonstrate the willingness to put 
restrictions or surveillance on social media. A study of Internet censorship and 
established democracies (Dick 2012) shows that democracies, through legislative and 
technical mechanisms, have mimicked authoritarian regimes. (Dick 260)  
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With or without a governing model, social media can serve as a corrective balance 
to traditional media, operating as a channel for timely corrections of a misstatement or 
error in fact by a conventional journalist. This process may further the ends of 
democratization, providing an outlet to establishment or state media. For example, during 
the Egyptian protests against President Hosni Mubarak’s regime, there were mainstream 
media reports in the United States that credited nonviolence strategist Gene Sharp as one 
of the leaders. Those reports were confronted by social media users in Egypt. The New 
York Times was taunted by some Twitter users with the hashtag #GeneSharpTaughtMe. 
(York 2011, 50)   
From another perspective, with or without a governing model, social media may 
have the opposite effect on democratic mores, becoming instead an instrument of 
silencing debate in the public sphere. This silencing would not come from the traditional 
consideration of state surveillance, tracking and blocking, but from what could be 
considered peer pressure. According to a report published by the Pew Research Center, 
“It makes people less likely to voice opinions, particularly when they think their views 
differ from those of their friends….” (Miller 2014) 
Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan 1994) posits that the medium is the message. He 
contends that it is not content per se that could affect people, but the medium that 
provided the content that could shape attitudes in society. Is social media the message? It 
does shape society in many ways, including 24/7 connectedness and the distractions of 
emails and texts. But, can it separate from mass media and represent a democratic 
distinction with a difference? China, for example, has created Renren, Weibo, and Youku 
to take the place of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, respectively. If authoritarian 
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governments have the ability to monopolize the virtual sphere, there is less chance for a 
transition to democracy; if democratic governments control some of that sphere as well, 
there is less chance for democratic consolidation. 
The challenge for emerging democracies, as well as established democracies, is to 
recognize social media as a tool for expression and mobilization by citizens. It is a tool 
that may be somewhat regulated, but necessarily integrated into democratic governance. 
It is not an easy challenge as both democracies and autocracies deal with their own 
notions of state security and control.  
A report by Freedom House, “Freedom On The Net” 2013, notes that “…global 
Internet freedom has been in decline for the three consecutive years tracked by this 
project, and the threats are becoming more widespread.” (Kelly et al. 1) According to the 
Freedom House report, there are ten forms of control used by governments: blocking and 
filtering; cyber-attacks against regime critics; passing new laws and generating arrests for 
political, religious, or social speech online; paying government commentators to 
manipulate online discussions; physical attacks and murder; surveillance; takedown 
requests and forced deletion of content; blanket blocking of social media and other 
information and communications technology (ICT) platforms; holding intermediaries 
liable; and throttling or shutting down Internet and mobile services. (Kelly et al. 3-7) The 
issue, then, seems to be one of two ships passing in the night. One ship is the democratic 
trend enhanced with social media tools; the other, the increasing sophistication of tools 
used by states to monitor and disrupt citizen activism.  
The Freedom House report, while noting the increasing controls by states, also 
remarks on the increase in citizen online activism. “In 11 countries, negative laws were 
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deterred as a result of civic mobilization and pressure by activists, lawyers, the business 
sector, reform-minded politicians, and the international community.” (12)  The increase 
in citizen online activism demonstrates that individuals and civic groups can utilize these 
implements despite state impediment. The negative developments still outweighed the 
positive ones for 2013, but examples outlined in the report show some hope for progress, 
especially in cases where the judiciary plays a role (at least within democratic regimes). 
The case can be made that social media is a two-way street, or stated more 
elegantly, part of a continuum that ranges from a democratic tool, used by individuals or 
groups, to a surveillance tool used by the state. There is another use of social media, 
which has been effectively used in recent months by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS), i.e. in spreading terror by posting online propaganda videos of villages being 
overrun, fiery rhetoric by spokespeople and grizzly videos of beheadings. “In addition to 
launching their own websites, terrorists can harness the interactive capabilities of 
chatrooms, instant messenger, blogs, video-sharing websites, self-determined online 
communities and social networks.” (Weimann 2010, 46) Social media can also be 
effectively used by terrorists to recruit and organize attacks around the world, using, in 
addition to Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, Google Earth for logistical planning 
purposes. The ISIS example is not the first use of social media for terror through 
propaganda and/or operations, just the latest.  
The influence of social media in new and established democracies can be limited 
by Internet penetration, social development, degree of democracy, etc. It is also limited 
by the architecture of social media itself. Facebook, Twitter and other platforms have 
user agreements that can encourage democratic dialogue and mobilization, but can also 
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narrow the range of communication options. Usability is key to social media as its 
structure and regulations enable or disable that usage. (Youmans and York 2012, 316) 
Those structures and regulations are still evolving. One possible alternative…civic 
technologies, proposed by Jonathan Zittrain, (325) such as Wikipedia, which are not 
constrained by governmental or commercial gatekeepers. 
There are studies that compare the Internet and social media’s impact on society, 
but few that quantitatively look at the impact of global social media on democratization, 
especially in new or emerging democracies. One study by Victoria Stodden and Patrick 
Meier looks at new communication technology and democratic tendency through 
empirical evaluation and asks the question: “Does the globalization of the Internet have a 
democratizing effect”? The study is two-fold, laying out definitions of democracy with a 
literature review comparing and contrasting the two schools of thought. The first school 
is the populist school of thought that looks to the Internet as a liberating tool. Included in 
that school are Dahl, Best and Wade, Rheingold, Grossman, Barber, Snider among 
others. The other school views the Internet as “…an extension of the ruling class and 
centralized control.” Included in that school are Barber, Bimber, Lippmann, Page, 
Goldsmith, De Mesquita, and Downs. (Stodden and Meier 2009) To synthesize the 
multiple approaches to defining democracy, the authors use three perception-based 
measures of governance from the World Bank indicators for their dependent variables: 
Voice and Accountability (VA) for political participation and democratic freedoms; Rule 
of Law (RL) encompassing the value of  the police and the courts, and the prospect of 
crime and violence; and Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PS), the likelihood 
of regime destabilization or removal by violent and/or illegitimate means. (2)   
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Stodden and Meir’s study draws data from the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) from 2000-2006, a relatively recent time period compared to other studies, 
given that both Internet access and cell phone use are more widespread than studies that 
were conducted in the 1990s. The authors use data from both the Internet and cell phone 
data per 100 inhabitants in 181 countries. Regression analysis is employed to determine 
whether there was a correlative effect in either direction: measures of democratic 
tendency and democratic measures on Internet and cell phone use. (2)    
While more research is called for at the end of their study, the authors make the 
following conclusions: while the political structure of power generally has not been 
transformed into a wave of democracy because of technology (in the narrow sense of 
Internet and cell phone diffusion as studied by the authors), there is some direction in the 
populist school of thought. Stodden and Meir find a statistically significant positive 
relationship between the rate of cell phone diffusion and the dependent variable of 
“Political Stability.” (12) Though they find a significant negative relationship between 
cell phone diffusion and “Voice and Accountability,” the authors posit that it may still be 
too early to expect an intimate relationship between global technology and a democratic 
deliberation in a public setting. (12) The diffusion of ICT access had no major influence 
on any of the three World Bank indicators. (12) The authors also note that cell phones 
had an earlier footprint than the Internet on a global scale, which may account for a 
difference in results in a future study. (12) 
A predecessor to Stodden and Meir’s study is “The Internet and democracy: 
Global catalyst or democratic dud?” (Best and Wade 2009) The authors study Internet 
usage from 1992 to 2002, and look at “…the relationship of a nation’s gross domestic 
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product (GDP) per capita (purchasing power parity [PPP]) and adult literacy along with 
measures of the nation’s level of civil liberties and political rights” (256) through an 
aggregate measurement of stages of democratization. Internet penetration is expressed by 
the number of users (per 1,000 people). (256) Six regions are used as independent 
variables: Africa, Asia, Eurasia, Middle East, Latin America, and Western Europe. (260) 
It was an early look at the Internet’s impact on democracy, and the authors conclude that 
Internet penetration demonstrates more variation in levels of democratic development 
within a country than other variables such as literacy rates and geographic regions. Their 
contention is that the statistical triumph of the Internet is due to its role as a transmission 
belt for government transparency and non-governmental organization (NGO) 
effectiveness. The authors, however, do not claim that “…the Internet is a natural boon to 
democracy,” (270) noting that, in their study, some geographic regions seem unaffected 
by amounts of Internet usage. A comprehensive theory was deemed impossible, 
therefore, given the variation in regions. Because their study incorporates six different 
regions, their statistical analysis concludes that the Internet has not made a significant 
impact in Western European nations. (269) This corresponds “…with Scheufele and 
Nisbet’s (2002) finding that the Internet does not enhance democracy in America.” (269)  
Another study of democracy and ICT diffusion was offered by Philip N. Howard 
(Howard 2010) in looking at a diverse group of countries with Muslim communities. He 
suggests “A Technological Theory of Democracy” (183), one that connects the diffusion 
of technology with the “significant changes” (183) in the countries’ systems of political 
communication. His approach is through the use of set theory that demonstrates “…the 
explicit connections between information technologies and democracy building in 
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countries with large Muslim communities.” (184)  Howard argues that while ICT 
diffusion can benefit both the autocratic regime and the democratic impulse, there is 
ample evidence to demonstrate a “close causal connection” between ICT proliferation 
and democratization. It is not an exclusive feature of democracy, but clearly a subset of 
the set of democracies. (197-198) The author’s contribution to the literature is his 
insistence that while democratization can be helped by the Internet and social media, the 
results are varied across political systems and need to be recognized and acknowledged.    
The issue of social media in stages of democratization cannot be addressed in 
isolation. In other words, one must also look at global trends to see if the environment is 
hospitable or harsh for social media in general. If Internet freedom is challenged globally, 
then it would seem that emerging democracies would have a harder time utilizing social 
media for democratic transition or consolidation. It is not just the challenge of social 
media in emerging democracies and in the consolidation of democracies, but the 
sustainability of democracies themselves.  
An essay in The Economist argues that democracy is going through a hard time.  
It is one thing to kick out an autocrat, but difficult “…to create viable democratic 
regimes.” (The Economist March 1, 2014) Look no further than the Egyptian experience. 
The essay posits that democracy, particularly liberal democracy or neoliberalism, has 
stalled in the 21st century, due to debt and dysfunction. “Democracy has always had its 
critics, but now old doubts are being treated with renewed respect as the weaknesses of 
democracy in its Western strongholds, and the fragility of its influence elsewhere, have 
become increasingly apparent.” (1)  
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Why the stall? The Economist points to the financial crisis of 2007-08 and the rise 
of China, particularly that nation’s demonstration that economic progress can be attained 
without liberal democracy. (2) According to the essay, there is hope for democracy, as 
long as that democracy is not illiberal, meaning that it takes more than a majority to make 
a democracy work. “The most successful new democracies have all worked in large part 
because they avoided the temptation of majoritarianism -- the notion that winning an 
election entitles the majority to do whatever it pleases.” (4) India and Brazil are cited as 
examples of countries that have put limits on the power of the regime and expanded the 
rights of individuals. (4) 
Another challenge for social media and democratization is the issue of 
government surveillance and censorship, not only by autocratic regimes, but democratic 
governments as well. An example, noted by Philip N. Howard, were U.S. trade 
restrictions on some types of digital content, which prevented the use “…of detailed maps 
by people in other countries.” (Howard 2011, 174) The filtering service denied access to 
maps of a particular region by identifying the IP address of the computer. The author also 
notes the use of a “robot.txt” file during the George W. Bush presidency, used to restrict 
searches for approved documents, while the White House staff had no such restrictions. 
(174) 
There is also the question of possible regulation of social media in a democratic 
state. Why the need for regulation? According to Jacob Rowbottom, “…the dominance of 
media elites will not become a thing of the past and even with the relatively low costs of 
distribution, a small number of speakers, often with substantial economic resources 
behind them, will consistently command a mass audience.” (Rowbottom 2006, 501) 
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In addition to the continued domination of “old media” through websites and their 
star personalities, the gatekeeping role is maintained by search engines such as Google, 
which aggregates the information and prioritizes it in a way which may not reflect the 
public interest. (503). “A range of other private actors also impact on the opportunities 
for online expression, including software companies that produce user-friendly 
applications, ISPs and non-state regulators such as ICANN.” (508) Another example: 
While NGOs have used social media to further democratic trends in a global context, 
there is the issue of transnational organizations, “the ruling class,” (269) utilizing social 
media to counterbalance democratic activism. The case could be made, therefore, for 
regulation to ensure democratic access and as a counterweight to private control or 
domination of the Internet and other forms of social media. The broadcast model of 
regulation through the FCC might not be appropriate for social media, but a balanced 
approach to access and resistance to major economic domination of the Internet by 
private interests may bear further study.  
Social media can also serve as a balance to media elites, democratic or otherwise. 
For example, Twitter and Facebook can serve as channels for instant corrections of a 
misstatement or error in fact by a traditional journalist. This ongoing process may further 
the ends of democratization. “In reporting on the Egyptian uprising, for example, various 
U.S. media outlets repeatedly credited Facebook, Twitter, WikiLeaks and even 
nonviolence strategist Gene Sharp for the revolution. Through social media, Egyptians 
challenged these reports, such as when Twitter users mocked ‘The New York Times’ 
with the hashtag #GeneSharpTaughtMe.” (York 2011, 50) Ongoing corrections of fact 
are critical in a fast-moving protest, such as in Egypt; ongoing corrections in a 
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democratic environment are a healthy supplement to self-governing discourse. There are 
others, however, who think that social media has the opposite effect on democratic 
mores, becoming instead an instrument of silencing debate in the public sphere. 
According to a report published by the Pew Research Center, “It makes people less likely 
to voice opinions, particularly when they think their views differ from those of their 
friends….” (Miller 2014) 
When one considers democratization from the perspective of modernization 
theory, authors such as Jan Teorell posit that modernization does not promote democratic 
transition per se, but rather inhibits the regression to autocracy. (Teorell 5) From his 
standpoint, modernization supports democracy retention, but is not leading the way to 
democracy creation or transition. He finds that media proliferation, not education or 
industrialization, prevents coup formation. (6) The effect of an increase in media “…on 
democratization increases with the level of democracy already achieved.” (6) Economic 
conditions, in the short run, turn out to be counterintuitive, according to Teorell. 
“Economic upturns help sustain autocracies, whereas economic crises trigger transitions 
toward democracy.” (6) Teorell’s concept of media proliferation could easily incorporate 
the Internet and social media.    
Because economic development can be part of the process of democratic 
transition and consolidation, a look at the dynamics of technological (including social 
media) adoption by various types of regimes may help us understand its impact and/or 
acceleration. The unsettled debate on the “Dictator’s Dilemma” continues to serve as a 
brake on assumptions that social media is inimical to authoritarian regimes. While 
authoritarian regimes “…fear the political consequences of Internet expansion, they also 
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welcome its economic payoffs.” (Corrales and Westhoff 2006, 911) From that strictly 
economic point of view, the authors note that variation in technology adoption is a factor 
in separating high-performing regions and countries from others. While it is clear that an 
economic powerhouse that adopts technology does not need to be democratic (China, for 
example), the potential for democratic transition and/or consolidation is more likely to 
follow economic development. (Przeworski and Limongi 1997, 176) The authoritarian 
regime, in some cases, creates a balancing act between controlling political use of the 
Internet and encouraging non-political use of the Internet; some citizens may be 
frustrated by political control, while other citizens value “…the non-political  benefits 
that the Internet provides.” (Corrales and Westhoff 930) 
From a historic perspective, could one imagine the world of social media 
integrating in some way with democratic institutions? A glimpse of that vision came from 
Buckminster Fuller from a time before the Internet or social media. He saw democracy as 
having the potential to satisfy the needs of the individual through a democratic structure, 
but only if that structure were modernized so that it “…be mechanically implemented to 
give it a one-individual-to-another speed and spontaneity of reaction commensurate with 
the speed and scope of broadcast news now world-wide in seconds.” (Fuller 1971, 9)  He 
saw it as a form of “electrified voting,” which would expand citizens’ choices in the 
realm of legislation and administration. (Fuller 11)  In essence, it becomes a form of 
teledemocracy. (Becker and Slaton 2000)  
While it may be convenient to think of such concepts on a nation-state scale, 
social media as a contributor to democratic governance could apply to local governmental 
entities as well. Some cities could move beyond their official websites and form a 
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working laboratory for democratic governance. They could provide officials with instant 
feedback from both satisfied and unsatisfied constituents, not only through the 
municipalities’ websites, but through popular social media sites such as Facebook and 
Twitter. Perceived misdeeds by local officials and politicians could be amplified 
throughout the community by postings and tweets (and reinforced by traditional media, 
i.e. television, radio and newspapers). Established democracies, such as the United States, 
are more likely to experiment with such forms of democratic practices through social 
media, on a state or local basis, which could be utilized by emerging democracies as they 
increase democratic consolidation. The Alaska Legislative Teleconference Network 
(LTN), for example, operating from 1978-82, created 14 centers throughout the state that 
were connected to the capitol through computers. Citizens were interacting with “state 
officials, legislators, and/or congressmen….” (Becker and Slaton 131) A 
videoconferencing capability was later added. Does this concept of interacting with 
officials and the next possible step, voting electronically in real time, seem farfetched? 
Thomas Jefferson thought so when he stated that, “A democracy [is] the only pure 
republic, but impracticable beyond the limits of a town.” (Matsusaka 2005, 157) His 
conclusion was reached before the advent of the Internet. A further look at social media 
may additionally challenge the assumption of Mr. Jefferson. 
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Chapter 5 
  Social Media 
 
As challenging as the definition of democracy can be, social media, because of its 
relatively recent development, can be more easily categorized. While there are myriad 
definitions of social media, it generally tends to be thought of in an informal 
communicative context. This paper will incorporate the U.S. Federal Web Managers 
Council’s definition of social media “…as the various activities that integrate technology, 
social interaction, and content creation.” (Rishel 2011, 418) It is generally demarcated by 
accessibility, affordability, portability, and reach. In that sense, social media could be 
considered democratic itself, allowing individuals, with limited means or rights, an equal 
access to connect and communicate with fellow citizens and governmental bodies, as 
well as a larger global audience. While there are countermeasures of the state that can 
partially or substantially thwart that accessibility, affordability, portability, and reach, the 
mechanisms of social media allow for possible work arounds and other measures to allow 
voices, images and messages to be sent and received.   
Specific kinds of social media include Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Myspace, 
Instagram, and Tumblr. Devices utilizing social media include computers, computer 
tablets, and smart phones. All are reliant on the infrastructure or platform of the Internet. 
The nature of social media, unlike traditional media, provides a one-to-many and 
one-to-one method of communication, either in real time or in subsequent minutes or 
hours. While other media provide avenues of expression, e.g. letters from readers to a 
publication, callers to a talk show, or protesters speaking to a television reporter, all are 
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subject to editing. Social media, however, provides a continuous unedited feedback loop 
of communication among many people on a global scale. Even a previously recorded 
video uploaded on YouTube allows for instant posted comments.   
There is a distinction between the software of social media websites and platforms 
and the hardware of computers, cellular and smart phones, etc. A brief history may 
clarify some of these concepts. 
Though the posting of public messages on the Internet goes back to the creation of 
Usenet in 1979, “social media” as a term began after the introduction of MySpace in 
2003 and Facebook in 2004. The terms “Web 1.0” and “Web 2.0” refer to, respectively, 
the content produced by individuals and content produced collaboratively. Web 2.0 
features the tools to create content collaboratively, including: Adobe Flash for adding 
animation, interactivity, and audio/video streams to web pages; RSS (Really Simple 
Syndication) for publishing frequently updated content; and AJAX (Asynchronous Java 
Script), which allows for updating web content without interfering with the display of the 
whole page. (Kaplan and Haenlein 61) The complementary key to Web 2.0 is User 
Generated Content (UGC), which relies on the “functionalities” mentioned above for 
creation and distribution. Users of social media, to have any ongoing effect on 
democratization in any stage and in any region, would necessarily need these tools of 
Web 2.0. 
 While there have been demonstrations throughout history, and protests covered 
by newspapers in the modern world, there has been no dominating technology to spread 
the word across a region. (Rhue and Sundarajan 2012, 40) There have been forms of 
media that could transmit word of events from one place to another, including the nearly 
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forgotten (but still active in the 21st century) shortwave radio. Generally, however, radio 
and shortwave radio were at the service of a controlling government or authority. The 
seminal birth of social media in an era of globalization and protest, as evidenced by the 
Green Movement in Iran and the Arab Spring, had an impact that other past media did 
not. Social media enabled protesters to communicate to the outside world through voices, 
images and messages and to organize and mobilize demonstrations. There were 
distinctions, based on local conditions, which affected the utilization and effectiveness of 
social media. There is a difference, however, between the ability to communicate and 
mobilize against an authoritarian regime and the subsequent declaration of victory for 
some form of nascent democracy. While the events in Iran and Egypt seem to have 
validated the Managers’ Council’s description of social media in the context of protest 
and mobilization, it does not necessarily apply to democratic consolidation and 
governance. 
The following case selections will hopefully contribute to the understanding of 
social media. First, the recounting of events in Iran and Egypt and a review of the 
literature will provide a view of social media’s influence in communication and 
mobilization. Then, an assessment of Nepal and South Africa will afford a view of social 
media’s influence in democratic transition and consolidation.   
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Chapter 6 
Case Selection: Iran  
 
Iran offers some insight into the use of social media and the two-edge sword of 
communication/mobilization and surveillance/tracking. 
Protests began in Iran following the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on June 
12, 2009. Seyyed Mir-Hossein Mousavi Khameneh, the reformist candidate and former 
Prime Minister of Iran (1981-1989), challenged the results and claimed victory. His 
supporters turned out in large numbers to challenge the “rigged” results of the election, 
which ensured another term of office for Ahmadinejad. As the protests and counter-
protests escalated, social media technologies were employed. The “Twitter Revolution” 
was a simplified description of the process, however, since “…there were just over 
19,000 Twitter users in Iran out of a total population of just under 80 million.” 
(Christensen 2011, 238)   
The Iranian demonstrations generated global attention most likely due to the 
strategic implications of a successful confrontation with a radical regime. It is a challenge 
for any political protest in a country that, despite some democratic trappings, is still 
considered a theocracy. The regime is relatively impervious to world opinion and can 
mount an aggressive counter attack against its own protesting citizens. Nonetheless, the 
importance of social media in this case is due to it being an example of contestation in a 
new arena. Politics, power relations, and rhetoric could conceivably be disputed in this 
space that some scholars posit as “The Agnostic Social Media….” (Rahimi 2011, 158) 
The irony is that while there is a popular notion of new media technologies as liberating 
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tools, (Diamond 2010, 70) the alternative view is, “What the new media technologies, in 
particular the Internet, have ultimately provided for the state are new operative spaces to 
strategically reconfigure societal relations and political activism in favor of maintaining 
status quo.” (Rahimi 161) 
What does this mean in a practical sense? The Iranian government has reacted to 
three phases of Internet development. From 1994 to 1998, the regime, ignorant of its 
disruptive potential, tolerated its rapid growth. In July 1998, the Internet was utilized by 
dissenters to publicize a student revolt and the regime began to restrict users’ access by 
lowering connection speeds and filtering sites. In 2005, Ahmadinejad’s administration 
began identifying and suppressing its opponents using intelligence agents and promoting 
its own ideology. (Golkar 2011, 59) When the Green Movement utilized social media to 
communicate to the international community and coordinate protests, the government 
employed a host of counter measures. The administration could track protesters’ 
messaging, locate individuals through GPS tracking and arrest them. They could also 
slow down Internet speeds to make downloading of videos and pictures difficult. While 
the West provided assistance through the use of proxy servers and the United States 
requested Twitter postpone planned server maintenance so communications could 
continue, the Iranian government made effective use of opponents’ social media to 
counter with its own disinformation. Some of the specific countermeasures included 
increased website blocking, website hacking and virus spreading, identifying users by 
their IP addresses, surveillance of Internet cafes for obtaining user information, and 
threatening email messages. 
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The confluence of social media prominence and state counter-measures, best 
reflected in the events of the Green Movement in Iran, has generated considerable debate 
about what worked and did not work during that volatile period. The popular notion of a 
“Twitter Revolution” is disputed in some of the literature. From the news media 
standpoint, for example, a study by Megan Knight of sources used by the press during the 
elections of June 2009 and the subsequent protests, demonstrated a reliance on traditional 
types, such as political statements and expert opinion. (Knight 2012, 61) This does not 
discount the communication streams of social media, but instead emphasizes the reliance 
of the professional press on traditional channels.  
The professional media had its own challenges. Despite its lack of reliance on 
Twitter and other social media, it was subject to control and intimidation by Iranian 
authorities during the protests. According to Reporters Without Borders, “Journalists 
have suffered more than ever this year in Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Iran. The president’s 
disputed reelection plunged the country into a major crisis and fostered regime paranoia 
about journalists and bloggers.” (Press Freedom Index 2009) 
Another popular notion, disputed by some of the literature, is that the use of social 
media in Iran was dwarfed by the use of social media outside of the country, both by the 
diaspora and others. Kavanaugh notes that “…in the case of Iran during the June 2009 
post-election demonstrations, there were fewer than 100 estimated Twitter users inside 
Iran. The bulk of the tweeting was being done by users outside Iran, often re-tweeting 
posts from users inside the country.” (Kavanaugh 8) 
A look at the three measurable indicators for Iran from 2003-2013 shows a 
continual increase in Internet users (per 100 people), fixed broadband Internet subscribers 
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(per 100 people), and mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people). Significantly, there 
is major growth in fixed broadband Internet subscribers in the year following the 2009 
protests, and in subsequent years. Either Iran is secure in expanding the Internet or secure 
in using counter-measures to prevent communication among and mobilization from 
dissidents. The fourth indicator, the Freedom House scores, representing levels of 
freedom in a country, have not changed throughout this period for Iran. Iran has received 
a six out of seven rating as “Not Free” (on a scale with one as the best and seven as the 
worst). Given the increase represented by the data from the World Bank and the 
continued intransigence of the Iranian regime, one can conclude that social media, while 
possibly effective as a communication and mobilization tool, cannot be effective as a tool 
in democratic transition.  
 
Table 1. Iran Internet Users Per 100 People, 2003-2013 
Year  Users 
2003  6.93 
2004  7.49 
2005  8.10 
2006  8.76 
2007  9.47 
 2008  10.24 
 2009  11.07 
 2010  14.70 
 2011  21.00 
 2012  27.50 
 2013  31.40 
Average:14.24; Standard deviation: 8.6; Increase: 353.1% 
Source: World Bank 
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Table 2. Iran Fixed Broadband Internet Subscribers Per 100 People, 2003-2013 
Year  Subscribers 
2003  0.02 
   2004  No data 
   2005  No data 
2006  0.14 
2007  0.27 
2008  0.41 
2009  0.54 
2010  1.29 
2011  2.35 
2012  4.02 
2013  5.61 
Average: 1.63; Standard deviation: 2.0; Increase: 27,950% 
Source: World Bank 
 
Table 3. Iran Mobile Cellular Subscriptions Per 100 People, 2003-2013 
Year  Subscriptions 
2003  5.33 
2004  7.31 
 2005  12.13 
 2006  21.67 
 2007  41.45 
 2008  59.17 
 2009  71.46 
 2010  72.58 
 2011  74.30 
 2012  76.09 
 2013  84.24 
Average: 47.79; Standard deviation 30.9; Increase: 1,480.5% 
Source: World Bank 
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Table 4. Iran Freedom House Scores, 2004-2014 
(On a scale with 1=best, 7=worst) 
Year  Score  Designation 
2004  6.0  Not Free 
2005  6.0  Not Free 
2006  6.0  Not Free 
2007  6.0  Not Free 
2008  6.0  Not Free 
2009  6.0  Not Free 
2010  6.0  Not Free 
2011  6.0  Not Free 
2012  6.0  Not Free 
2013  6.0  Not Free 
2014  6.0  Not Free 
Note: The annual Freedom House reports depict data from the preceding year. As such,  
the 2004 entry contains information from January 1-December 31 of 2013.   
Source: Freedom House 
 
 
The Iranian example is one of push back against social media used for purposes of 
political communication and mobilization. It is a case of a regime that resists both 
internal and external pressure to modify its governmental and political structure and is a 
clear example of the two-edge sword of social media.  
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Chapter 7 
Case Selection: Egypt 
 
In Egypt, widespread protests began against President Hosni Mubarak’s 
government on January 25, 2011. Despite Mubarak’s attempts to maintain control and 
block social media (only partially successful), he was forced to resign later that year. 
There is conflicting opinion about the impact of social media in the Egyptian protests as 
well, brought to the forefront and highlighted by Mubarak’s attempt to cut off the Internet 
and digital tools. Some of the writings contend that there was no need for consideration 
of the “Dictator’s Dilemma” (which highlights the contradiction between a need for 
control and a need for commerce), because the force behind Mubarak’s resignation was 
not necessarily social media, but the protesters’ feet on the ground. “Within Egypt, 
activists had been trying to ignite a revolution using blogs and Facebook for a decade, 
with little sustained success. Many protesters in Egypt bristle at the suggestion that their 
revolution was a ‘Twitter revolution,’ emphasizing instead their organization on the 
ground and physical presence on the streets.” (Aday et al. 6)   
Zeynep Tufekcil and Christopher Wilson argue that social media had an impact 
on the protests in Tahrir Square in a specific way. Based on a survey of participants in 
Tahrir Square, they posit that Facebook particularly (and social media in general) 
provided a basis for decision making in protest participation, logistics and chance of 
success. (Tufekcil and Wilson 2012, 363) Geography of protests apparently played a part 
in the application of social media. For example, Tahrir Square was the focal point of 
protests against Mubarak. Some argue that since “ground zero” was known, there was not 
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as much need for social media to organize and mobilize protests. In other words, 
everybody knew where to go.  
In the context of these two historic events, Iran with one outcome and Egypt with 
another (and still evolving), the conclusion that social media assisted in communications 
and mobilization in a significant way remains unsettled. Given the right set of 
circumstances, the sophistication of social media users, the lack of expertise for counter 
measures on the part of a particular government, and the susceptibility to international or 
regional pressure, social media (in the role of communications and mobilization) could 
play a part.   
A look at the three measurable indicators for Egypt from 2003-2013 shows, 
despite a year of turmoil in 2011, there is a recurrent increase in Internet users (per 100 
people), fixed broadband Internet subscribers (per 100 people), and a healthy increase in 
mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) in the year 2012. The fourth indicator, the 
Freedom House scores, has not changed dramatically throughout this period for Egypt. It 
has improved marginally from 2003, when the country received a 6 out of 7 rating (on a 
scale with one as the best and seven as the worst). From 2003 forward, Egypt received a 
5.5 rating, with the exception of 2013 when President Morsi was still in power. That year, 
the country received a “Partly Free” designation of 5.0. The increased penetration of 
social media, which helped in the initial phases of communication and mobilization, and 
may have had an impact on democratic transition in 2012, cannot be ruled out for a future 
role in Egypt. The decision to remove President Morsi from office, though he was 
democratically elected, was broadly supported for Egypt. While not an electoral decision, 
it did represent the will of the people. 
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Table 5. Egypt Internet Users Per 100 People, 2003-2013 
(Per 100 people) 
Year  Users 
2003  4.03 
 2004  11.92 
 2005  12.75 
 2006  13.66 
 2007  16.03 
 2008  18.01 
 2009  25.69 
 2010  31.42 
 2011  39.83 
 2012  44.00 
 2013  49.56 
Average: 24.26; Standard deviation: 15.0; Increase: 1,129.8% 
Source: World Bank 
 
Table 6. Egypt Fixed Broadband Internet Subscribers Per 100 People, 2003-2013 
Year  Subscribers 
2003  0.07 
2004  0.11 
2005  0.19 
2006  0.35 
2007  0.64 
2008  1.01 
2009  1.36 
2010  1.85 
2011  2.32 
2012  2.83 
2013  3.25 
Average: 1.27; Standard deviation: 1.1; Increase: 4,542.9% 
Source: World Bank 
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Table 7. Egypt Mobile Cellular Subscriptions Per 100 People, 2003-2013 
Year  Subscriptions 
2003  8.34 
 2004  10.82 
 2005  18.98 
 2006  24.66 
 2007  40.54 
 2008  54.69 
 2009  72.09 
 2010  90.50 
  2011  105.07 
  2012  119.91 
  2013  121.50 
Average: 60.65; Standard deviation 43.5; Increase: 1,356.8% 
Source: World Bank 
 
Table 8. Egypt Freedom House Scores, 2004-2014 
(On a scale with 1=best, 7=worst) 
Year  Score  Designation 
2004  6.0  Not Free 
2005  5.5  Not Free 
2006  5.5  Not Free 
2007  5.5  Not Free 
2008  5.5  Not Free 
2009  5.5  Not Free 
2010  5.5  Not Free 
2011  5.5  Not Free 
2012  5.5  Not Free 
  2013    5.0  Partly Free 
2014  5.5  Not Free 
Note: The annual Freedom House reports depict data from the preceding year. As such,  
the 2004 entry contains information from January 1-December 31 of 2013.   
Source: Freedom House 
 
 
The Egyptian example is a case of the ousting of a leader while the state remained 
unchanged. Subsequent events demonstrated that electoral democracy was initiated, but 
the popularly elected president was removed by the military with the backing of the 
majority of the population. Social media seems to have played a part in the 
communication and mobilization phase of the protests, but did not prevent a slide back to 
authoritarianism.  
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Chapter 8 
Case Selection: Nepal  
 
Nepal, officially the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, is one country where 
both democratic transition and social media are contemporary dynamics. Though we 
cannot necessarily extrapolate the experiences of democratic transition and social media 
penetration in Nepal and apply it globally, a look at this country in the 21st century can 
provide some insight into the interaction of these two forces. While Nepal is a small 
country, it was included as a case selection for its modern experience as an emerging 
democracy, its challenging societal makeup, and its nascent Internet structure and social 
media applications. Nepal also has a third reality, the literacy rate, which can affect the 
production and consumption of social media. There is a distinction, however, between the 
written screen (texts, for example) and audio and video, which can effectively be utilized 
by those who cannot read or write. 
Since the 1950s, the Nepal political structure has been transformed from a 
hereditary monarchy to a constitutional monarchy, to absolute power by the king, to a 
federal democratic republic. It was a rocky transition to democracy. In 1951, the Nepali 
monarch established a cabinet system of government. In 1990, a multiparty democracy 
within the framework of a constitutional monarchy was created, but six years later, an 
insurgency led by Maoists broke out. During the 10-year civil war, the king assumed 
absolute power (2002) dissolving the cabinet and parliament. In late 2006 a peace accord 
was reached and an interim constitution was announced.  
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After national elections in April 2008, the Constituent Assembly (CA) declared 
Nepal a federal democratic republic and abolished the monarchy. It elected the country's 
first president in July. Between 2008 and 2011 there were four different coalition 
governments, led twice by the United Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist, and twice by 
the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist-Leninist (UML). The Supreme Court set 
the drafting of a constitution by May 2012, but the Assembly was unsuccessful in doing 
so, and was dissolved by then Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai. The major political 
parties agreed to create an interim government in March 2013, headed by then Chief 
Justice Khil Raj Regmi, with a mandate to hold elections for a new Constituent 
Assembly. Elections were held in November 2013, resulting in a coalition government 
formed in February 2014. (World Factbook, CIA) 
While Nepal has a democratic structure that is relatively new and social media 
penetration that is relatively low, the country can provide an opportunity to look at the 
growth of social media while its democracy consolidates. There are challenges to this 
nation-state, including hosting “…125 ethnic and caste and 123 linguistic groups where 
Nepali serves as a lingua franca.” (Dahal 2014) Dahal is optimistic, though, concluding in 
his essay on social media that, “The informational revolution has unleashed the aspiration 
of participatory democracy and development in Nepal that stresses on citizens 
participation in public life, improved governance steering, coordination and collective 
action in the delivery of public goods and services, civic renewal and citizenship 
building, judicious role of non-state actors and justice-promoting development 
measures.” (Dahal 2014)    
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Contrast Dahal’s perspective with a paper presented by Lal Babu Yadav at 
Telegraph Weekly/FES (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung) national level media seminar on 
December 20, 2001. Yadav notes that, “Knowledge about the right to information is not 
context free. In Nepal where public literacy is just about 40 percent and functional 
literacy is about its half, one can easily guess how many people know about their 
fundamental rights and duties.” He also addresses the uneven distribution of “instruments 
of media,” bemoaning the lack of access by people living in remote areas. Lack of access, 
according to Yadav, means less participation in policy and decision making affairs. The 
uneven distribution of income and pervasive poverty prevents parts of the population 
from consideration of such issues as “globalization” and the “information highway.” 
Mundane matters, such as education, healthcare and irrigation come first. (Yadav 3) 
In 2012, Ujjwal Acharya argued, in a policy discussion paper on behalf of the 
Alliance for Social Dialogue, for the creation of a policy for online media. While 
narrowing the paper to a discussion of media and excluding citizen use, Acharya posited 
that “…the state should play a role of facilitator for the growth of the Internet-based 
media, which contains within itself the power to bring positive changes in our society.”   
(Acharya 4) While access to the Internet and devices that connect to the Internet are 
important topics, Acharya’s paper focused on content and the media that generates that 
content. The author noted the possible negative uses of the Internet, citing the London 
riot, violence in Assam, and “…campaigns to misinform the public about an incident in 
Malaysia. Despite government’s denial of deaths of any Nepalis in the airplane crash in 
Malaysia, some deliberately used photos of other conflict zones around the world to 
claim they were images of Nepalis who died in Malaysia.” (4) 
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As mentioned in an earlier chapter, attempts to shut off the Internet by Egyptian 
authorities were mostly ineffective during the Arab Spring and led to commercial 
disruption. A similar case occurred in Nepal in 2005. A “natural experiment” that 
demonstrated the effects of a shutdown occurred on February 1, 2005. The Kingdom of 
Nepal shut off telecommunications, both internally and externally, because of a threat 
from what it called Maoist insurgents. (Ang et al. 548) It had limited success, due to the 
parallel communications system of the rebels. 
Nepal’s unique geography must also be considered. Not all of the country is easily 
accessible for phone service, especially in the mountains in this landlocked country. (552) 
“…many parts of Nepal are accessible only on foot. Sometimes, it can take three to four 
days for a villager to reach the nearest bus stop. Telecommunication links are therefore 
all the more valuable, especially as a substitution for transportation where possible.” 
(553)  The government strategy at the time was not necessarily to shut down all phone 
service (although that was the practical effect), but to halt anonymous pre-paid users, 
since captured insurgents were found with prepaid phones in their possession. Once the 
service was restored, all users had to register (including the prepaid users). (553) Later 
reports indicated that the insurgents had their own network and that the government was 
using the shutdown to keep political parties from organizing in urban areas. The initial 
shut down was effective, but past the point of two weeks, citizens were increasingly 
perturbed.  Business was disrupted and the social network of individuals was disturbed. 
What were the implications for democracy? “The managing director of Nepal 
Telecommunications said the shutdown in phone service was ironic. He said that it was 
thought that telecommunications created the movement for democracy in 1990 as it 
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helped to disseminate information fast.” The shutdown was ‘self-defeating,’ leading to a 
crisis that made the king’s security worse. (560)   
The transition to democracy for Nepal began on May 28, 2008, when the newly 
elected assembly demonstrated that the country would become a secular and inclusive 
democratic republic. As Nepal transitioned into democracy, young adults utilized 
Facebook and other social media to pressure political parties to draw up a constitution.  
After a civil war and the abolition of the monarchy, a new constitution was supposed to 
be drafted by May 2010. The delay in drafting set off the campaign, “Nepal Unites,” 
which mobilized young protesters for four consecutive Saturdays using social media 
sites. Internet penetration in Nepal at the time (2011) was 625,000 users and a penetration 
rate of 2.2%. (Internetworldstats.com) “In less than a month, thousands of young 
professionals, activists and students have joined the campaign to press lawmakers to 
complete the transition to democracy. For most of them, this is the first time they have 
turned out to take part in such protests -- whether on the streets or on the net. Their 
message to lawmakers was simple: “No work, no pay.” (“Nepal’s Youth Turn to Social 
Media.")  
The use of social media by candidates during the Constituent Assembly (CA) 
election was highlighted in 2013. According to a report by “My Republica,” candidates 
capitalized on the social media platforms instead of customary flyers and posters. “The 
candidates, especially of the major political parties, including the UCPN (Maoist), Nepali 
Congress, the CPN-UML, have not only asked for votes via Facebook but also used it as 
a platform to explain to voters why they should win the election and their party's policies 
and programs.” The parties also established official Facebook pages and websites. (“Poll 
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candidates using social media to reach out to voters”) Internet penetration in Nepal in 
2012 was 2,690,162 users and a penetration rate of 9.0 %. (InternetWorld Stats.com)  
The Nepal Telecommunications Authority (NTA) data penetration rate reached 26.93% 
by mid-August in 2013, prior to the vote count. (NTA) This year, 2014, increased social 
media usage was experienced after the vote count of the second Constituent Assembly 
election in September. “‘Online social media is instant and carries informative value,’ 
said Binod Bhattarai, a media expert talking about the Twitter and election updates. He 
added that this was probably the first time Nepalis have used the social and online media 
in such a way and that it has also indicated that traditional media like TV stations and 
newspapers need to reinvent themselves.” (“Nepalis flood social media with poll result 
updates”) That statement could parallel a contemporary discussion in established 
democracies with technological sophistication. The information revolution in Nepal 
media is acknowledged as crucial to democratic consolidation. One example comes from 
the People’s Review Weekly: “The informational revolution has unleashed the aspiration 
of participatory democracy and development in Nepal that stresses on citizens 
participation in public life, improved governance steering, coordination and collective 
action in the delivery of public goods and services, civic renewal and citizenship 
building, judicious role of non-state actors and justice-promoting development 
measures.” (Dahal 2014) 
There is another view of the utilization of social media in Nepal, distinct from 
concepts of democracy vs. control. A report by The Himalayan News Service in 2011 
noted the increase in mobile Internet and cable and wireless modem/fibre-optic 
connections, but laments the lack of economic utilization: “…data revealed that the users 
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are not utilizing Internet for productive works, experts said. Penetration has been 
increasing but the trend cannot fundamentally promote national economy, director at the 
Nepal Telecommunications Authority Ananda Raj Khanal said.” ("NTA, Net Users on 
Mobile Increase”) Khanal concludes that the increase in social networking sites, blogs 
and entertainment sites diverted focus from the importance of commerce. In other words, 
the 2011 increase in the penetration rate of social media did not contribute to the national 
economy.  
The future of democratic consolidation in Nepal clearly rests with the young, and 
despite the pessimistic economic evaluation of Khanal, young people could utilize social 
media for political awareness and communication. “But if the social media fuelled (sic) 
youth activism is any indication, it will play a major role in creating political awareness 
among the youths putting them in the frontlines of positive change in their society.” (My 
Republica 2011) 
In 2014, the United States announced grant assistance - through U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) -- of $402 million to Nepal. ("US Announces $402 
Millon for Strengthening Democracy in Nepal”) The U.S. indicated that it would be used 
to strengthen Nepal’s democratic institutions. Nowhere in the announcement, ironically, 
was there a line item contribution for social media development.  
If social media is increasingly utilized for political discourse and awareness, and 
is combined with economic development (and grant assistance), there is a future for 
democratic consolidation. But from the view of Khanal and others and, from the 
perspective of modernization theory, Internet penetration rates alone do not guarantee 
economic progress, which is essential to preventing a slide back to non-democratic rule.   
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A look at the three measurable indicators for Nepal from 2003-2013 shows a 
dramatic increase in Internet users (per 100 people) from 2009 to 2010, fixed broadband 
Internet subscribers (per 100 people) from 2011 to 2012, and mobile cellular 
subscriptions (per 100 people) from 2006 onward. The fourth indicator, the Freedom 
House scores, representing levels of freedom in a country, are in the middle range for 
Nepal, averaging 4.0-4.5, “Partly Free,” with the exception of 2006, where the country 
was rated at “Not Free” at 5.5. Given the general increase in users, subscribers and 
subscriptions and Freedom House scores, there is no obvious correlation between social 
media usage and democratic consolidation.   
 
Table 9. Nepal Internet Users Per 100 People, 2003-2013 
Year  Users 
2003  0.32 
2004  0.44 
2005  0.82 
2006  1.14 
2007  1.41 
2008  1.73 
2009  1.97 
2010  7.93 
2011  9.00 
 2012  11.14 
 2013  13.30 
Average: 4.47; Standard deviation: 4.9; Increase: 4,056.3% 
Source: World Bank 
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Table 10. Nepal Fixed Broadband Internet Subscribers, Per 100 People, 2003-2013 
Year  Subscribers 
2003  0.00 
2004  0.00 
2005  0.00 
2006  0.00 
2007  0.04 
2008  0.04 
2009  0.05 
2010  0.21 
2011  0.34 
2012  0.62 
2013  0.75 
Average: 0.19; Standard deviation: 0.3; Increase 1,775% 
Source: World Bank 
 
Table 11. Nepal Mobile Cellular Subscriptions Per 100 People, 2003-2013 
Year  Subscriptions 
2003  0.33 
2004  0.46 
2005  0.89 
2006  4.51 
 2007  12.59 
 2008  16.00 
 2009  21.08 
 2010  34.25 
 2011  49.17 
 2012  60.45 
 2013  71.46 
Average: 24.65; Standard deviation: 25.6; Increase: 21,554.5% 
Source: World Bank 
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Table 12. Nepal Freedom House Scores, 2004-2013 
(On a scale with 1=best, 7=worst) 
Year  Score  Designation 
2004  4.5  Partly Free 
2005  5.0  Partly Free 
2006  5.5  Not Free 
2007  4.5  Partly Free 
2008  4.5  Partly Free 
2009  4.0  Partly Free 
2010  4.0  Partly Free 
2011  4.0  Partly Free 
2012  4.0  Partly Free 
2013  4.0  Partly Free 
2014  4.0  Partly Free 
Note: The annual Freedom House reports depict data from the preceding year. As such,  
the 2004 entry contains information from January 1-December 31 of 2013.   
Source: Freedom House 
 
While there is seemingly no correlation between social media and democratic 
consolidation in Nepal at this time, the increases in penetration over the years may result 
in increased political participation, particularly by the young. Increased political activity 
could enhance consolidation in the future.  
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Chapter 9   
Case Selection: South Africa 
 
The Republic of South Africa, a regional power on the continent, faces the 
challenges of both a colonial and apartheid past as it deals with its democratic present.   
Though South Africa is a single nation, its racial, economic and political currents make it 
a diverse state where local traditions and customs play a part in daily life. (Ross 2008) 
Great Britain, which gained formal possession of the Cape Colony in 1814, 
combined its Cape and Natal colonies with the Boer republics in 1910 to create the Union 
of South Africa. South Africa's National Party (NP), after gaining power in 1948, devised 
the apartheid system that separated the country's population into racial groups. The 
country gained independence and became a republic in 1961, subsequently withdrawing 
from the British Commonwealth because of disapproval of its racial policies.  
(CultureGrams - ProQuest 2014) 
The African National Congress (ANC), which was first organized in 1912, led the 
opposition to apartheid, but was banned in 1960 for its activities and communist views. 
Nelson Mandela, along with other ANC leaders, was jailed. International sanctions 
followed. Frederik Willem (F. W.) de Klerk, elected president in 1989, began to reform 
the country’s political system. He released Mandela and legalized the ANC. 
Subsequently, the party suspended it armed resistance. (CultureGrams - ProQuest 2014) 
The first multi-racial and multi-party elections in 1994 brought an end to 
apartheid and resulted in majority rule under an ANC-led government. Mandela was 
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elected president in 1996, and a new constitution that guaranteed equal rights was 
ratified. (CultureGrams - ProQuest 2014) 
The growth of social media in South Africa began in 1990 when the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) issued the .za domain to South 
Africa, allowing the development of Internet access via computer. “The country's social 
media then experienced an even bigger growth spurt by the Internet developing at such an 
astonishingly high pace.” (van Eeden, Taljaard and Borchardt 2013) 
While a survey of Lexis Nexus indicates that most articles on social media in 
South Africa focused on economic aspects, not political use, there is evidence of social 
media utilization during the recent electoral campaigns. (Tracey 2013) The utilization of 
social media in democratization goes further than its application in elections. In a subset 
of social media penetration, a report of women’s adaptation and political use in a 
democratic context was analyzed in a journal article by Desiree Lewis, Tigist Shewarega 
Hussen and Monique van Vuuren. (Feminist Africa 2013) “South Africans marginalized 
on the basis of age as well as gender have used new media platforms to carve out spaces 
of freedom and moments of independent communication. These spaces and moments 
rarely provide direct political commentary or resistance; Rather, they offer cognitive 
spaces in which certain youth, and young women in particular, articulate their 
consciousness of their social, cultural and political world.” (48) Even as the authors note 
consciousness over participation, the carved out spaces allow for communication, which 
can lead to “consciousness raising,” and ultimately stimulate political action. The 
challenge, however, for women and young people, is the culture the authors attribute to 
South Africa, where the young are expected to defer to the old. President Jacob Zuma, in 
  57 
responding to dissent by former ANC Youth League  President Julius Malema and his 
supporters, conveyed the established notion that “…clearly implies that South African 
politics, similar to the politics of other postcolonial states in Africa, is the domain of the 
veterans, the ‘old,’ those who fought for liberation and ensured that a younger generation 
has freedom.” (48)   
The impact of social media in South Africa demonstrates a change and challenge 
to that cultural mindset. The advantage of that change and challenge is that it occurs in an 
emerging democracy, not an authoritarian regime. Instead, it is a challenge to a 
paternalizing mentality. A key element of the rise of social media, from a female 
perspective, is imagery. Lewis, et. al note the importance of images in today’s 
technological world, both as a subtext of South African feminism, but also an indicator of 
a broader political context. “The resonance of images combining very little text are a 
reminder of the importance of the communicative value of fragments of information in 
the digitised age. It is possible to see the effects of these as discouraging reflection, 
promoting information that is quickly digested and forgotten. But the animated responses 
to many of the short digital activist messages on Facebook pages such as Actifem is 
evidence of their impact -- in politicising groups and encouraging further reflection.” (60)   
Despite acknowledged inequality by scholars, journalists and others, including the 
ways that social media are accessed (prepaid vs. subscription, smart phone vs. basic 
mobile phones, 3G network vs. slow EDGE and GPRS connections), and exploitatively 
priced mobile network tariffs, there is still the reality of social media as intermediary in 
the quest for democratic consolidation. In light of that inequality, social media is used in 
democratic discourse. “In South Africa, political parties have now adopted Facebook 
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across the board, and it is also used for everyday political expression and participation by 
many individuals and civic organizations.” (Walton and Leukes 154) The authors posit 
that, for purposes of their article “… it is sufficient to draw the inference that mobile 
applications played a particularly important role in broadening access to public discourse 
via Facebook….” (160)  
It is important to note again that simply having access to Facebook or other social 
media does not guarantee consumption of messages. Mxit, a ground-breaking application 
that helped speed the adoption of the mobile Internet, provided mobile instant messaging 
and chat platforms without hyptertextual link-sharing. That limits access to the larger 
democratic conversation, (153) because there is no measurement of page popularity, no 
trending topics as in Twitter, no indexing by major search engines such as Google. There 
is change in the air, however. “Our case study of mobile political discourse in 2012 
shows Mxit shifting towards an increasing openness….” (160) That openness would 
allow more technical applications that would, in turn, encourage more content and more 
distribution. From a democratic perspective, that would be a positive change.  
Ironically, as younger people in South Africa take to mobile social media and 
challenge the culture and politics within a democratic framework, Facebook usage has 
declined in the nation. According to Pretoria News (April 8, 2013), “Statistics from social 
media monitoring company SocialBakers show 967, 220 fewer South Africans logged on 
to the social network in the last six months (October 2012-March 2013).”  While the 
largest age group of South African Facebook users were 18-to-24-year-olds (1,679,620 
users), divided evenly between males and females, the fastest growing age group among 
Facebook users in South Africa were over-60s. Given the deference in the culture to the 
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older generation, this could be interpreted as an interest in the over 60 years of age 
demographic in utilizing social media as citizens for political discourse and activity. It 
could also be a disinterest by the younger generation once an interest was shown by the 
older generation. 
Political parties in South Africa have also recognized the impact of social media 
and have incorporated them into campaigns. An article in the January 25, 2014 issue of 
The Star, written by Craig Dodds, addresses the key role social media would play in the 
May 7, 2014 elections. The African National Congress (ANC), late to the social media 
party, launched a new app on Mxit. “Arthur Goldstuck, managing director of technology 
market research firm World Wide Worx, said Mxit was one of the few tools available to 
the ANC to fend off the EFF's (Economic Freedom Fighters) efforts to woo young voters 
with its social media-smart campaign and militant image.” (Dodds) Significantly, 
Goldstruck says the impact of social media will be even greater in 2019 because of the 
pervasiveness of Internet and social media access. Dodds also quotes Wadim Schreiner, 
former chief executive officer of Media Tenor, on the effectiveness of social media 
influence in urban areas, such as Gauteng. “‘With such a high density of people and such 
a high uptake of social media, and the level of conversation going on in Gauteng on 
social media, there is a high likelihood that social media could be the decisive factor in 
one or two percentage points, which might just be the one or two percentage points that 
shift the elections towards one side or the other….’” (Dodds) 
Personalization becomes a factor in South African political parties’ use of social 
media. “…while ANC president Jacob Zuma has a Twitter account and an impressive 
309,000 followers, ‘everybody’ knew he did not personally tweet,” according to 
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Goldstruck. (Dodds) Dodds notes that, “DA (Democratic Alliance) leader Helen Zille, on 
the other hand, has tweeted about everything from vicious rodent attacks in her driveway 
to reports of leadership battles in the party.” (Dodds) As social media increases in 
awareness, pervasiveness and sophistication, its integration into the body politic appears 
likely, with democratic consolidation likely to follow.   
The democratic utilization of social media in South Africa is not limited to 
established political parties. Mamphela Ramphele, a former activist against apartheid 
who became a medical doctor, an academic and a businesswoman, formed a new political 
party, Agang South Africa. She views social media as an important tool, telling reporters 
at a news conference, “You can multiply your troops very quickly on social 
media…Thank God for information technology.” (Quintal and Areff 2013) While she 
later withdrew from the party after a controversial decision to renege on a promise to 
merge Agang South Africa with the Democratic Alliance and run as its presidential 
candidate, the use of social media was recognized as essential for a nascent party.  
South Africa, despite its apartheid past and current challenges of inequality 
stemming from that history, is beginning to utilize social media for democratic 
consolidation. It is a learning curve for this emerging democracy, but if economic 
development and social media development are not disrupted, then South Africans can 
have a reason to be optimistic. While developed countries, both democratic and 
autocratic, utilize social media both economically, recreationally and politically, it 
appears that new democracies such as South Africa are on a learning curve for 
development and application.   
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A look at the three measurable indicators for South Africa from 2003-2013 shows 
an increase in Internet users (per 100 people) from 2009-2013, fixed broadband Internet 
subscribers (per 100 people) from 2009-2013, and increasing mobile cellular 
subscriptions (per 100 people) with major growth in 2004-2005 and 2010-2013. The 
fourth indicator, the Freedom House scores, representing levels of freedom in a country, 
changed from a high of 1.5 in the years 2003-2005 to 2.0 2006-2013, but despite the 
change in rating, South Africa has been designated as a “Free” country. The increase in 
Internet users, fixed broadband Internet subscribers, and mobile cellular subscriptions 
coincides with the increased political use of social media, increased usage by political 
parties and the development of more sophisticated social media applications. Given these 
figures, and its status as a “Free” country, there is the potential for an effect on 
democratic consolidation in the future.  
 
Table 13. South Africa Internet Users Per 100 People, 2003-2013 
Year  Users 
2003  7.00 
2004  8.42 
2005  7.48 
2006  7.60 
2007  8.06 
2008  8.43 
 2009  10.00 
 2010  24.00 
 2011  33.97 
 2012  41.00 
 2013  48.90 
Average: 18.62; Standard deviation: 15.7; Increase: 598.6% 
Source: World Bank 
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Table 14. South Africa Fixed Broadband Internet Subscribers Per 100 People, 2003-2013 
Year  Subscribers 
2003  0.04 
2004  0.12 
2005  0.34 
2006  0.68 
2007  0.76 
2008  0.87 
2009  0.94 
2010  1.44 
2011  1.74 
2012  2.11 
2013  3.06 
Average: 1.10; Standard deviation 0.9; Increase 7,550% 
Source: World Bank 
 
Table 15. South Africa Mobile Cellular Subscriptions Per 100 People, 2003-2013 
Year  Subscriptions 
2003  35.97 
2004  43.82 
2005  70.40 
2006  81.07 
2007  85.27 
2008  89.52 
2009  91.24 
2010  97.90 
 2011  123.19 
 2012  130.55 
 2013  147.46 
Average: 90.58; Standard deviation: 34.1;  Increase 310% 
Source: World Bank 
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Table 16. South Africa Freedom House Scores 
(On a scale with 1=best, 7=worst) 
Year  Score  Designation 
2004  1.5  Free 
2005  1.5  Free 
2006  1.5  Free 
2007  2.0  Free 
2008  2.0  Free 
2009  2.0  Free 
2010  2.0  Free 
2011  2.0  Free 
2012  2.0  Free 
2013  2.0  Free 
2014  2.0  Free 
Note: The annual Freedom House reports depict data from the preceding year. As such,  
the 2004 entry contains information from January 1-December 31 of 2013.   
Source: Freedom House 
 
South Africa’s history and unique place on the continent provides a view of a 
democracy that, despite challenges, has the resources to develop both its social media and 
democratic spaces. 
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Chapter 10 
Conclusion 
 
     While the Internet had its origins in the 20th century, social media developed 
in the 21st century with the introduction of MySpace and Facebook. Despite it being a 
relatively new phenomenon, social media has demonstrated a pervasive effect on the way 
we think, interact, and do business. This paper reviewed the literature on the Green 
Movement and The Arab Spring, examined two emerging democracies, and outlined the 
social media tools available to people and to the state. Because of social media’s 
exponential growth, its evolutionary and/or revolutionary nature makes it challenging to 
keep abreast of ramifications and to predict its future in all areas of life. Even this paper 
is a snapshot in time and place, and a narrow focus on selected emerging democracies.  
There are clearly limitations in my approach to the subject and a challenge to explain the 
ephemeral aspects of social media and democratization. 
     Despite this constricted view, there are several observations that can be 
expanded upon by others interested in the ongoing development and accessibility of 
social media in the political world. Over time, more data will become available and more 
perspectives will be shared on the influence, impact and nature of social media.  
For a current perspective (Washington Post 2014), the protests in Ferguson, 
Missouri surrounding the death of Michael Brown, demonstrate an example of social 
media’s impact on communication and mobilization. The “contagion effect” was evident 
in the buildup to the Grand Jury announcement through Twitter. Information about who 
was participating in the protests, location of the protests, and designated safe areas were 
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some of the components of the process. Group identity was another consideration, shaped 
by the number and tone of the tweets. (Tucker 2014). Additional factors for the 
pervasiveness of social media in this case were speed, comprehensive coverage through 
multiple users, the ability to search for key information and to provide news not covered 
by the traditional media. Social media, as mentioned earlier, can be a double-edge sword.  
In this case, there was no interference by the state, but people may choose not to 
participate in protests because information may indicate that the protests could turn 
violent. In the example of Ferguson, however, there is not enough data to suggest such 
causality.   
     The infrastructure and utilization of social media in emerging democracies 
may not be as sophisticated as those in developed democracies or autocracies. However, 
globally, the marked increase in Internet penetration and social media websites (and their 
applications) year to year should lead to a developing refinement.  
     The experiences of protesters in Iran and Egypt demonstrated that even with 
low levels of penetration, the perceived effectiveness of social media in mobilizing and 
communicating with large groups of people can be influential, both domestically and 
internationally. Does this indicate instant regime change and transition to democracy?  
Given the power of the state to effectively or partially block and censor social media, the 
changes in regime or regime composition remain, from a democratic perspective, 
frustratingly slow. It seems to be a case of hurry up (social media) and wait (democratic 
transition and consolidation). Patience, however, may have its virtue in that globalization 
and the “flat world” concept articulated by Thomas Friedman may provide the lubrication 
for the engine of social media. 
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      If the medium is the message, perhaps Aldous Huxley’s brave new world will 
not be a nightmare of politics and technology, but rather a democratic “flat world” of 
interconnectedness and democratic values. The composition of political leadership and 
organization on the streets may have more of an impact on democratization than social 
media, and a leader or leadership structure is important for any political organization, 
mobilization and, eventually, governance. The culture of a nation is essential to consider 
as well, as noted in the attitudes of South African leaders who believe the older 
generation knows better than the young generation on running a country. Since there are 
many definitions of democracy, democratic values may have to be decided by each nation 
and its people, taking into consideration cultural differences and stages of development.     
     The future of democracy, in any form, may not be exclusively dependent on 
social media, but as technology broadens and becomes more portable than ever, it is 
possible to foresee a future where access to voting, expressing one’s opinion, or 
mobilizing supporters is accessible via hardware on every individual’s wrist (e.g. Apple 
Watch) or head (e.g. Google Glass). That access would not be limited to high-income 
individuals, but rather would become a given for all global citizens, similar to the 
extensive penetration of the Internet and pervasive cell phone usage that we know today. 
The once constricting digital divide could be a thing of the past.   
     The connecting bonds formed by social media between human beings, nation-
states, regions of the world and transnational organizations may erase the concept of 
exogenous and endogenous influences and provide a new way of communicating and 
governing. In that possible future, with equal access to political power, there may be a 
need for added definitions of democracy.  
  67 
     One cannot minimize, however, the state’s use of the Internet and social media 
for surveillance and monitoring.  While autocracies such as China can certainly prosper 
with the Internet and other forms of social media, technology cannot be completely 
controlled by the state. The fourth wave of democracy may be slow in coming, but given 
the inventiveness of digital entrepreneurs, the tools of liberation can be enhanced and the 
possibility of loosening the reins of autocracy and transition to democracy must be 
considered. From the perspective of emerging democracies, the utilization of social 
media by citizens to communicate and mobilize, and the adoption of social media by 
political parties, demonstrates that such countries could be on the road to democratic 
consolidation. One of the ways of keeping democracies intact, from the perspective of 
modernization theory, is to marry economic development to social media.  Paradoxically, 
as noted earlier, social media can also be utilized for economic development. The 
relationship is both symbiotic and sequential. One can precede the other, or both can 
develop simultaneously. In either case, the future of democracy and social media will 
hopefully be a brave new world of hope. 
While this paper cannot say definitively that social media has had a major 
influence on democratic transition and democratic consolidation in the four case 
selections, the infrastructure is continuing to expand to enable social media to play an 
ever increasing role in the future. My view is that the transforming nature of social 
media, despite the double-edge sword of state reaction and its resources to curtail, control 
and block, will play a future defining role in democratic transition and consolidation. 
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